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Abstract
This paper discusses the development of mathematical psychology, decision theory, 
and behavioral decision research at the University of Michigan in the 1950s and 
1960s. It focuses on the question how to understand the connection to economics 
these three psychological programs considered, and provides a background for 
understanding subsequent developments of Kahneman and Tversky’s work in the 
1970s, and the following rise of behavioral economics from the 1980s onwards.
I define the historical and organizational characteristics of the University of Michigan 
and its department of psychology and explain why the Institute of Social Research 
(ISR) is remarkably absent in the history discussed in this paper. Subsequently, I 
describe the background and development of mathematical psychology and show that 
it employed a two-faced understanding of psychology as using the human being as 
measurement instrument to measure human decision behavior. After this, I discuss the 
background and development of decision theory and behavioral decision research, 
which employed the same understanding of psychology and were hence closely 
related to mathematical psychology. I finish by reviewing the close connection 
between measurement theory and behavioral and decision theories in these 
psychological programs, and conclude that their frequent references to economics 
should and should not understood as a close relation to the economic discipline . 1
1 Email: F.Heukelom@fm.ru.nl. John Davis, Harro Maas, and Marcel Boumans are gratefully 
acknowledged for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. Any remaining mistakes are my 
own.
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1. Introduction
From the 1950s to the 1970s the University of Michigan was the center of American 
psychology. It grew from seven faculty members in the late 1940s to some 225 
faculty members in the second half of the 1960s [Krantz -  Interview (2008), see also 
e.g. Peckham (2005), pp.245-266, Frantilla (1998)], and hosted the Institute of Social 
Research (ISR), Clyde Coombs’ (1912 - 1988) Michigan Mathematical Psychology 
Program and Ward Edwards’ (1927 - 2005) Engineering Psychology Laboratory and 
behavioral decision research. Over the years the ISR has received much attention in 
the literature [e.g. House et al. (2004), Bulmer (2001), Hyman (1991), Hollinger 
(1989)]. Under the heading of the ISR, George Katona conducted his surveys on 
consumer confidence at the Survey Research Center (SRC), and even coined the label 
‘behavioral economics’ to refer to this research. The history of Coombs’ mathematical 
psychology and Edwards’ behavioral decision research, on the other hand, has been 
much less explored. However, because of the frequent references to economics it 
employed, and because of the background it provides for the rise of Kahneman and 
Tversky’s behavioral economics during the last thirty years, an historical analysis of 
this part of research at the University of Michigan is equally justified.
This paper, then, discusses the development of mathematical psychology, 
decision theory, and behavioral decision research at the University of Michigan in the 
1950s and 1960s. It focuses on the question how to understand the connection to 
economics these three psychological programs made and provides a background for 
understanding the subsequent development of Kahneman and Tversky’s work in the 
1970s and the following rise of behavioral economics from the 1980s onwards. In the 
first section I define the historical and organizational characteristics of the University 
of Michigan and its department of psychology in more detail. Subsequently, the ISR 
and its different centers need to be briefly discussed because of their remarkable 
absence in the history of mathematical psychology, decision theory, behavioral 
decision research and thus Kahneman and Tversky’s behavioral economics. After 
that, the third section deals with mathematical psychology in the period roughly 
between 1950 and 1975. The fourth section describes the background and rise of 
behavioral decision research during the same period. Finally, the fifth section 
illustrates the close link between mathematical psychology, decision theory and 
behavioral decision research.
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2. Psychology at the University of Michigan and the Institute for Social Research
David Krantz (1938- ) and Robyn Dawes (1936- ), two key actors in the Michigan 
Mathematical Psychology Program in the 1960s and 1970s, recall how the department 
of psychology at the University of Michigan grew tremendously during the postwar 
years . 2  In the immediate postwar years, before Coombs arrived in 1949, the 
department consisted of seven (voting) faculty members. As said, over the next two 
decades it expanded tremendously. Not all of these faculty members were full time 
employed by the department of psychology, although all could vote. By the late 1960s 
and 1970s the department of psychology employed roughly 60 full-time equivalents. 
Researchers had a part-time, or often even a zero-time contract with the department 
and held part time contracts with other institutions such as the ISR and the medical 
science departments. In fact, a considerable number of psychologists were working at 
the children’s hospital, in the mental health program or in other medical science 
departments of the University of Michigan [Krantz -  interview (2008)]. Still other 
psychologists were partly or wholly financed by external funds or grants. Coombs and 
his Mathematical Psychology Program, for instance, were financed through a grant 
from the National Institute of General Medical Science [Dawes -  interview (2008)]. 
However, these multiple affiliations should not be seen as the result of vying for 
research funds among the psychologists. In fact, just the opposite was the case: there 
was enough money for nearly everyone to pursue their own ideas and interests in a 
general atmosphere of “live and let live” [Krantz -  interview (2008), Dawes -  
interview (2008)]. Moreover, although the employer undoubtedly to some extent 
constrained the research, it was generally a non-binding way. Dawes, for instance, 
was employed for a year by the ISR and had an office in their building, but conducted 
very little work for them and continued working with Coombs and the mathematical 
psychologists [Dawes -  interview (2008)].
These characteristics are important because it meant that if  some 
psychologists, or groups of psychologists did not want to meet each other or discuss 
the merits of each other’s work, they never had to because of the general availability 
of funds. It is in this light that the relationship between Coombs and Edwards should 
be seen. Both were strong, but very contrasting personalities who each had very 
different scientific programs, and the large number of people around and the general
2 Interview of the author with Krantz, Columbia University, New York, June 20, 2008. Interview of the 
author with Dawes, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, June 23, 2008.
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availability of funds ensured that they could conduct their own research programs 
without ever really having to confront one another. Furthermore, when two 
researchers with different backgrounds and research projects were interested in each 
other’s work, or interested in perhaps joining forces, there was little if  any pressure to 
do so. Thus, Coombs and the other mathematical psychologists were aware that their 
work concerning the axioms of measurement was in one way or another related to the 
measurement methods used at the ISR, and vice versa the researchers at the ISR were 
equally aware of the work of Coombs and others [Krantz -  interview (2008)]. But in 
day-to-day practice both groups simply pursued their own research agendas.
In the 1950s-1970s, the department of psychology was divided into ten fields 
of specialization: experimental, mathematical, physiological, personality, social, 
community, industrial organization, and the two largest, clinical and counseling 
psychology. Later, physiological psychology was relabeled biological psychology and 
mathematical psychology became part of experimental psychology, illustrating the 
close connection between both. But this classification was relatively loose and more a 
matter of classifying what people were doing than assigning them what to do. Coombs 
was only associated with mathematical psychology, but Edwards’ Engineering 
Psychology Laboratory was associated with both mathematical and experimental 
psychology. Tversky too was associated with both specializations. Krantz was related 
to experimental, mathematical, and physiological psychology and Dawes to 
mathematical and clinical psychology. Thus, the department of psychology had an 
organization, both in terms of where the money came from and in terms of fields of 
specialization [Krantz -  interview (2008)]. But, as a result of the large number of 
faculty members and the availability of funds, the organization in the 1960s was not 
tightly knit, so that everyone could more or less do what he or she wanted to do 
[Krantz -  interview (2008), Dawes -  interview (2008)].
Related to, but organizationally distinguished from the department of 
psychology were the centers organized under the Institute for Social Research (ISR). 
The Survey Research Center (SRC) was established by psychologist George Katona 
in 1946, who pioneered a social survey research on consumer sentiment. To finance 
the war, the American government had issued a large number of war bonds and with 
the end of the war in sight it wanted to know how likely it was that American 
consumers would maintain or liquidate these bonds. Because Katona felt that he could 
not immediately ask people what they would do with their money, he proposed
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starting with some general questions that would comfort the respondents and would 
get him or her to start thinking about their own budgets and future prospects. In these 
consumer confidence surveys Katona was the first to use the term ‘behavioral 
economics,’ as early as 1947 [Juster (2004), p.120]. Three years later, following the 
death of its founder Kurt Lewin (1890 - 1947) the Research Center for Group 
Dynamics (RCGD) was moved from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) 
to Michigan. The two groups remained separate but were brought together under the 
newly-created Institute for Social Research (ISR). Since 1949 the ISR has been joined 
by other centers, and new centers have been created within the body of the ISR, such 
as the Center for Political Studies (CPS) and the Population Studies Center (PSC). In 
the 1960s, the ISR for a while contained the Center for Research and the Utilization of 
Scientific Knowledge (CRUSK), which later dissolved and disappeared. The 
scientists staffing the different centers of the ISR were social scientists and a few 
statisticians. Many were sociologists or political scientists, but the majority in the 
1950s-1970s were the psychologists [Krantz -  interview (2008)].
In order to protect its general university funds, the University of Michigan 
insisted upon creating of the SRC in 1946 that it was to be funded entirely through 
grants and contracts; a policy that was also applied to the ISR when it was created in 
1949. This did not have any immediate financial implications as enough grants and 
contracts were available over the years. It did mean, however, that the ISR could not 
offer tenure to those it employed. There were always certain researchers who were the 
last to leave whenever funds ran out, but even these senior researchers and directors 
could never obtain tenure at the ISR [Krantz -  interview (2008), Juster (2004), 
Hollinger (1989)].
The ISR and its research are remarkably absent in the main story of this thesis. 
Because of Katona’s work on consumer confidence at the SCR and the term 
‘behavioral economics’ that he created, Coombs’ research and that of the 
mathematical psychologists is seemingly close to the psychological and social 
measurement of the ISR. One would imagine that there was some connection. 
Furthermore, Kahneman and Tversky’s work during the 1960s and 1970s on human 
beings’ perceptive and cognitive capacities [Heukelom (2009), chs.3 and 4] at the 
very least, related to survey research on consumer confidence. In addition, one could 
point to the fact that Dawes was employed for a year by the ISR while working for 
Coombs’ Mathematical Program. However, until Kahneman made a connection
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between his and Tversky’s work and the economic and psychological survey work 
through his program of hedonistic psychology in the late 1990s, no link of any 
significance can be observed. The ISR and the research conducted at its centers are 
noteworthy because of their complete absence in the history of mathematical 
psychology, behavioral decision research, Kahneman and Tversky’s collaboration and 
their behavioral economics.
The reason for this is that, although both the ISR and the mathematical 
psychologists and behavioral decision researchers were working on psychology and 
measurement, in fact the two groups conducted very different projects. The ISR 
worked on measuring actual social, psychological, and economic characteristics of the 
American population. In the social psychological tradition of Louis Leon Thurstone 
(1887 -  1955) and Kurt Lewin it measured the attitudes of the population to spending 
and saving, consumer confidence concerning the performance of the economy in the 
near future, and so on. Mathematical psychologists and behavioral decision 
researchers, on the other hand, investigated the underlying characteristics of the 
human being regarding decision making. In their research a measurement was 
understood to be a human decision between two stimuli, and was thus considered to 
be part of experimental psychology. In a general sense both groups were working in 
psychology and were concerned with measurement. But their actual research was only 
distantly related. Kahneman and Tversky’s research grew out of mathematical 
psychology and behavioral decision research. Therefore, the ISR is not relevant to 
understanding the rest of this story.
3. Mathematical psychology
The tradition of using mathematics in the study of psychological phenomena goes 
back to Gustav Fechner (1860) and is closely related to experimental psychology. 
Fechner’s psychophysics was a two-sided attempt to create a mathematical basis for a 
scientific field of psychology and to create a mathematical basis for (scientific) 
measurement. As measurement occurs through human observation, a theory of human 
observation is at the same time a theory of measurement, and a psychological theory 
of observation or perception [Heidelberger (1993, 2004), Daston and Galison (2007)]. 
As a basis for his psychophysics, Fechner posited the idea that the just noticeable 
difference (jnd) is constant across individuals. For instance, the smallest increment in 
the brightness of a light bulb glowing at a specific brightness, at a specific distance, in
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a specific environment, etc., Fechner supposed to be the same across individuals. 
However, jnd as a basis for psychophysics eventually fell victim to its own success in 
the 1920s after too many jnd’s had been reported and the idea of one constant jnd for 
each stimulus across individuals could no longer be maintained [Gigerenzer (1987a), 
p.8 ].
Thurstone sought to save the psychophysical program in the 1930s by 
proposing frequency distributions instead of jnd’s as a basis [Thurstone (1927a,b,c)]. 
Thurstone assumed that if  you give two different stimuli to the individual (say two 
lights of different brightness) a large number of times, the relative frequency with 
which the individual judges the one to be larger than the other will reflect which of 
the two was the brighter. Moreover, and very important, when the order of objective 
values of the stimuli was independent of which individual perceived it, it was equally 
valid to ask a large number of individuals, instead of one individual a great number of 
times. If you wanted to know which of the two light bulbs was the brighter you could 
ask any individual, but if  you wanted to know whether a Ferrari or a Bugatti is the 
more beautiful car, this method would be invalid as the order would differ across 
individuals. What one could ask, however, was whether drivers of a Saab consider the 
Ferrari or the Bugatti more beautiful, or whether Americans with a yearly income of 
over $2 0 , 0 0 0  have positive or negative expectations of future economic growth, or 
whether Protestants consider Catholics or Muslims more benevolent. These 
measurements were possible when one assumed that there is one preference of the 
Saab driver for either Ferrari or Bugatti, one preference of the Protestant for Catholics 
or Muslims when it comes to benevolence, and so on.
Similar to Fechner, Thurstone’s theory was as much a psychological theory of 
human perception as it was a theory of scientific measurement. Thurstone developed 
his theory of measurement to facilitate his own research on attitude measurement. In 
1928, he published a small book in which he reported the results obtained from 
having conducted an extensive investigation on religious attitudes, investigating for 
instance whether the Protestant has an attitude to the relative importance of work and 
leisure that is different from the Catholic [Chave and Thurstone (1928)]. In a one-time 
attempt to extend this work to economic demand theory, after holding discussions 
with Chicago economic colleague and friend Henry Schultz, Thurstone sought to 
construct the attitudes of the individual to different combinations of hats, shoes, and 
overcoats. The article was published in The Journal o f  Social Psychology, but
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Thurstone sought to connect experimental psychology and economics by labeling the 
curve that connected the different combinations of goods between which the 
individual was indifferent an “indifference function” [Thurstone (1931)]. Thurstone 
(1931) was picked up by a few economists in the 1930s-1950s [Moscati (2007)], but 
was, to the best of the author’s knowledge, ignored by experimental, social, and 
mathematical psychologists.
Thurstone’s measurement program was not the only existing measurement 
program. In the 1940s and 1950s also the representational theory of measurement rose 
to prominence. The most important contributor to the representational theory of 
measurement at this time was Stanley S. Stevens (1906 -  1973). Stevens’ program 
was strongly inspired by Bridgman’s operationalism [Bridgman (1927)], and defined 
measurement as the operation of assigning numerals according to a rule. Stevens 
distinguished between different types of measurement, ranging from the mere 
assignment of numerals without any further restrictions such as in the number of 
players on a football team, to that of ratio-measurement, in which it had to make sense 
to add, subtract, multiply and divide the numerals. The main question Coombs, a 
student of Thurstone in the 1930s, and later mathematical psychologists were 
interested in was whether it was possible, and if so how, to combine Thurstone’s 
measurement approach with the representational measurement tradition.
The term ‘mathematical psychology’ was coined by Thurstone in the 1930s 
but acquired common usage in the early 1950s following the creation of Coombs’ 
Michigan Mathematical Psychology Program in 1949. The key importance of 
Thurstone is always mentioned when the origins of mathematical psychology are set 
out [e.g. Frederiksen and Gulliksen (1964), Laming (1973), Luce, Bush, Galanter 
(1963a), Tversky (1991), Stevens (1951)], but the driving force behind mathematical 
psychology as a separate field in psychology was Coombs. An important catalyst was 
a two-month summer institute in Santa Monica in the summer of 1952, organized by 
Coombs and mathematician Robert Thrall, not incidentally a summer institute that 
also played an important role in shaping the newly created field of behavioral decision 
research and equally important in the history of game theory as revealed by historians 
of economics [e.g. Dimand (2005), Weintraub (1992), Lee (2004)]. The Santa Monica 
conference brought a range of psychologists, economists and other scientists working 
on the mathematical and experimental investigation of decision making together and 
thus facilitated the start and progress of much prominent research. Leading
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mathematical psychologists from the late 1950s onwards include, besides Clyde 
Coombs, David Krantz, and Amos Tversky, R. Duncan Luce (1925- ), Patrick Suppes 
(1922- ), and William Estes (1919- ).
The contributions made to the field increased so much that in 1964 the Journal 
fo r  Mathematical Psychology was founded . 3 This gave self-proclaimed mathematical 
psychologists a more solid basis. However, it had not yet become a society. In 1975 
the board of editors of the Journal fo r  Mathematical Psychology discussed the 
possibility of a merger with the Psychometric Society and its journal Psychometrika. 
This effort was due to the financial mismanagement of Psychometrika and the general 
desire of both groups to secure their financial future by combining conferences, 
journal administration and so forth. But, in addition, it was argued by individual 
members and the board of editors of both the Journal fo r  Mathematical Psychology 
and Psychometrika that also content-wise the merger might be beneficial. In the end, 
two proposals were put forward for voting in the two groups, one in which the two 
would be completely merged into one society with two journals and one in which two 
divisions would exist, each having their own journal under the umbrella of one 
overarching society. But although Coombs, Krantz, and Tversky had all indicated to 
Luce, one of the editors of the Journal fo r  Mathematical Psychology that they would 
vote in favor of a merger, both proposals were rejected. In response, the editors of the 
Journal fo r  Mathematical Psychology proposed in 1976 to create the Society for 
Mathematical Psychology . 4  This proposal was accepted and the Society was 
officially founded in 1977.
Mathematical psychologists defined their field not on the basis of a particular 
understanding of psychological phenomena, but instead on the basis of a method of 
investigation of psychological phenomena. The field was characterized as “the 
attempt to use mathematical methods to investigate psychological problems,” and it 
was thus, “not defined in terms of content but rather in terms of an approach” 
[Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky (1970), p.1]. It signified “not the study of a particular 
type of behaviour or the delineation of some new class of psychological phenomena 
but, rather, the application of new techniques to traditional psychological problems” 
[Laming (1973), p.1]. Mathematical psychology was defined rather broadly as an
3  The founding committee consisted of Richard C. Atkinson, Robert R. Bush, William Estes, R.
Duncan Luce and Patrick Suppes. This paragraph draws on letters and minutes from the archive of 
Luce in Harvard University.
4  The journal editors were Wlliam Batchelder, William Estes, B.F. Green, and R. Duncan Luce.
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attempt to use theories and techniques from the field of mathematics to represent and 
investigate psychological phenomena. As a result, all research that applied 
mathematics to what could be considered psychological phenomena in principle fell 
under the heading of mathematical psychology. This is illustrated by the three-volume 
Handbook o f  Mathematical Psychology (1963-1965) that started its exposition of 
what mathematical psychology is with a list of thirty-nine “Basic References in 
Mathematical Psychology . ” 5 Mathematical psychology aimed to synthesize all 
mathematical approaches to individual human behavior.
The scope of this list of basic references turned out to be more wishful 
thinking than an actual reflection of research conducted by mathematical 
psychologists. The inclusion of economist Kenneth Arrow and political scientist 
Herbert Simon suggested a synthesis that did not exist. Mathematical psychology was 
supposed to include all mathematical reasoning related to human behavior, but in day- 
to-day practice it was almost exclusively focused on psychophysics, measurement 
theory and decision theory [Gigerenzer and Murray (1987), Coombs et al. (1970)]. 
Mathematical psychology of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s was about the mathematics 
of measurement theory and, directly related, about the mathematics of decision 
theory. Decision theory will be discussed in more detail below. But before that it is 
necessary to devote a few words to the measurement theory of mathematical 
psychology.
The theory of measurement developed by the mathematical psychologists was, 
as said, inspired by both Thurstone’s and Stevens’ theories on measurement. 
Moreover, the effort to set up a mathematical psychology program by Coombs was 
principally influenced by Thurstone. Yet, after a while the work on measurement of 
mathematical psychologists drifted away from Thurstone and towards Stevens. The 
self-perceived task of the mathematical psychologists became to develop further the 
mathematical structure of Stevens’ view of measurement. The single most important 
publication on measurement of the mathematical psychologists were the three 
volumes of Foundations o f  Measurement (1971, 1989, 1990), a co-production of
5 These basic references include among others Arrow’s Social Choice and Individual Values (1951), 
N.R. Campbell’s Foundations of Science (1957), Chomsky’s Syntactic Structures (1957), Guilford’s 
Psychometric Methods (1954), Luce and Raiffa’s Games and Decisions (1957), Simon’s Models of 
Man (1957), Stevens’ Handbook of Experimental Psychology (1951), and Thurstone’s Multiple Factor 
Analysis (1947), and The Measurement of Values (1959).
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Krantz, Luce, Suppes and Tversky. It became the standard work on the 
representational theory of measurement in psychology.
In the summer of 1965, at the end of a three-week measurement workshop 
held at the University of Michigan, the already established scholars and long-time 
friends Luce and Suppes invited the “then two brightest young people working in the 
area” [Luce’s letter to Hamada, June 23, 1986] to write a book on measurement that 
would summarize and synthesize all the recent work done on measurement in 
mathematical psychology. Despite the gap between the publication of the first volume 
and volumes two and three, most of the three volumes of Foundations o f  
Measurement was written in the late 1960s.6
The main author of the first volume was Krantz, who consequently was also 
made its first author. The editor and first author of the second volume was Suppes, 
whereas the third volume was edited by Luce. The main initiator and contact person 
throughout the whole project was Luce. Luce and Tukey (1964), the very first article 
published in the Journal fo r  Mathematical Psychology, formed the basis for much of 
the measurement work in mathematical psychology, and hence also formed an 
important basis for Foundations o f  Measurement. Interestingly, the authors 
discovered along the way that much of what they were doing had been done before by 
mathematician and economist Gérard Debreu [e.g. Debreu (1954, 1958, 1959a,
1959b, 1960)]. But Debreu had taken a topological approach that was difficult to 
understand for economists and psychologists [Krantz -  interview (2008)]. The 
reference to Debreu is intriguing because it illustrates that economists and 
psychologists were working on the same phenomenon, but understood it differently. 
For mathematical economist Debreu his work was on utility theory, and for the 
mathematical psychologists it was about measurement. 7
In the first two sentences of the first chapter of the first volume of 
Foundations o f  Measurement the authors stated their belief in the representational 
theory of measurement and the object of their book explicitly: “When measuring 
some attribute of a class of objects or events,” they argued, “we associate numbers (or 
other familiar mathematical entities, such as vectors) with the objects in such a way
6 This paragraph draws on the interview with Krantz and letters from Luce’s archive in Harvard.
7
Also historians of economics have focused only on the economic interpretation of Debreu’s work.
For instance, Weintraub and Mirowski (1994) note that “Debreu is best read as providing a handbook 
for the working economic theorist of the neoclassical components of economic theory. In retrospect, it 
is hard to read Theory of Value [1959b] as anything else” (p.266).
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that the properties of the attributes are faithfully represented as numerical properties. 
In this book we investigate various systems of formal properties of attributes that lead 
to measurement in this sense” [Krantz et al. (1971), p.1]. Foundations of 
Measurement thus referred to the mathematical properties used in the numerical 
structure in the representational theory of measurement. The first chapter puts forth 
what were called the three basic procedures of measurement: 1 ) ordinal measurement, 
2) counting of units, and 3) solving inequalities. It only differs from the approach set 
out by Stevens (1939, 1951) in that it was more mathematically refined and 
sophisticated. The remainder of the book is based on these three procedures. This 
view of measurement served as an important component in decision theory and 
behavioral decision research, as set out below, but it also illustrates which approach 
mathematical psychologists took towards the world they investigated. I have followed 
the example of the measurement of length as it is used in Foundations o f  
Measurement (1971). The same example was employed in Stevens (1939, 1951), and 
Bridgman (1927), but using less mathematical formalization . 8
In ordinal measurement the only thing that is required for measuring the length 
of different rods is that numbers be assigned to rods of different lengths in a 
consistent manner. If one labels the different rods a, b etc, and considers the 
assignment of numbers to denote the length as a function of the rods, the only thing 
that is required for ordinal measurement is that “a f  b i f  and only i f  f(a) > f ( b r  
[Krantz et al. (1971), p.2], in which the difference between f  and > is the difference 
between the empirical and the numerical structure. That is, the numerical structure 
f(a) > f(b) can be mapped onto the empirical or natural structure a f  b . A 
mathematical relation, here an inequality, comes to represent the relation between two 
natural objects, of their relative lengths in this case. Hence, if  we have assigned any 
number to the first rod, and the second rod exceeds the length of the first rod, the only 
thing required in ordinal measurement is that we assign it a larger number. This is the 
most general and unconstrained procedure of measurement that can be applied to any
8 What I present here is a relatively brief sketch of one specific approach within the representational 
theory of measurement, based on Stevens’ classification of scales. For a methodological discussion of 
measurement in general and the representational theory of measurement in particular see Boumans 
(2004, forthcoming). For a thorough exposition of the history of measurement theory in nineteenth 
century experimental psychology and of the link of this psychological literature to interwar logical 
positivism see Heidelberger (1993, 2004). For a discussion of postwar measurement theory of the 
Foundations of Measurement, and its link to logical positivism/empiricism and Stevens, see Michel 
(1999, 2007).
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attribute of any object; provided that the empirical comparison can be made and that 
the sensitivity of the comparison process exceeds the disparities of the objects 
measured.
The procedure of counting of units, which is the second procedure in 
Foundations o f  Measurement, is an extension of ordinal measurement that allows for 
a comparison to be made of the lengths of the rods. If we wish to not only represent 
that a f  b, but also that, say, the length of rod a exceeds twice the length of rods of 
length b, hence a f  b o b ’, this is the procedure of measurement we require, where o 
is the notation for + in the empirical structure and b ’ is employed to distinguish in the 
empirical structure between two rods of the same size. With respect to ordinal 
measurement, a number of extra assumptions are needed in order to establish this 
procedure for the counting of units. For example, to make the representation for the 
addition of b o b ’ mathematically possible, we have to assume that two rods of 
lengths b can be represented by 2f(b). For the third procedure, that of solving 
inequalities, it requires in addition that the different distances between numbers in the 
numerical structure are meaningful representations for properties of the empirical 
structure. For instance, the numerical representation 2a + 5b = 3c needs to be 
regarded as a meaningful representation of the empirical structure.
The example illustrates that the representational theory of measurement in 
mathematical psychology started from mathematics and logic [Michell (2007)]. The 
fundamental assumption in this view of measurement is that if  the scientist wants to 
measure, he or she needs the appropriate mathematical system. Thus, it assumed that 
the phenomena he or she wants to measure are clearly defined. If the scientist wants to 
measure length, temperature, wealth, or utility, what he or she needs to do is specify 
mathematically all the characteristics used in the measurement procedure and  in the 
empirical system he or she wants to measure, and then afterwards apply this to the 
observations. When, for instance, the scientist starts from the observation or 
assumption that the natural phenomenon of temperature has transitive properties, the 
measurement system he or she uses must equally have transitive properties. However, 
when the scientist would forget to contemplate on the properties of the empirical 
structure first, the reverse is similarly true. The transitive property of the numerical 
structure then imply that the measurement of temperature are interpreted as transitive. 
This is equally true for situations where the human being is used as a measurement 
instrument. If the psychologist wants to measure the human perception of utilities
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through human beings using a measurement framework that employs transitivity, he 
or she needs to assume that human perception of utilities has transitive properties. 
Ideally one first discussed whether transitivity made sense in the case of temperature, 
religious attitudes or utility, but if  this stage was forgotten the mathematical 
framework used would determine how the world was understood.
As said, from its inception measurement theory has been linked to 
psychophysics and experimental psychology. Heidelberger (1993, 2004) shows that 
from the start Fechner’s psychophysics was as much a psychological theory relating 
objective stimulus to subjective sensation as a theory of measurement. Fechner 
devised his psychophysical system as a scientific foundation of measurement. It 
provided a scientific theory for the human body as a measurement device 
[Heidelberger (1993, 2004), see also Michell (2007)]. For the mathematical 
psychologists of the postwar period this link between psychophysics as a 
psychological theory and as a theory of measurement still served as the basis for their 
work.
It appeared to mathematical psychologists that mathematical psychology 
transcended the distinction between psychology and economics. As said, the basic 
references in mathematical psychology from the Handbook o f  Mathematical 
Psychology included the works of economists such as Arrow, Howard Raiffa, and 
Frederick Mosteller, who were considered to be important contributors to economics 
as well. In addition, the Handbook included publications written by non-economists 
which were considered to be important by economists for the field of economics, such 
as Savage and Simon. It also contained a book that was co-authored by a psychologist 
and an economist, Luce and Raiffa’s Games and Decisions (1957). In addition, the 
summer institute in Santa Monica in 1952 provided an important impetus for both 
mathematical psychology and economics.
Yet, to conclude from this that in mathematical psychology economics and 
psychology indeed were one and the same thing, and hence unified would be a 
mistake. The list of basic references used in mathematical psychology contained many 
more books that were unfamiliar to economists than it did books that were familiar. 9  
The 1952 Santa Monica conference, immediately mentioned when the history of 
mathematical psychology is touched upon, is important for mathematical psychology
9 Examples include Osgood’s Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology (1953), and Rosenbith’s
Sensory Communication (1961).
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because it was organized by a mathematical psychologist, Coombs, and afterwards 
proved to have been the beginning of a rapid rise in mathematical psychological 
research. The mathematical psychologists did not make a link to the field of 
economics in relation to the Santa Monica summer institute.
Mathematical psychology’s view of economics can be further illustrated by 
their discussion of what economists would immediately recognize as an economic 
book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944)’s Theory o f  Games and Economic 
Behavior, in Coombs et al. (1970) Mathematical Psychology, An Elementary 
Introduction. The Theory o f  Games and Economic Behavior, Coombs et al. argued, is 
the most important modern contribution to utility theory, that is, the theory that 
derives from the philosophical-psychological theory of utilitarianism. It is a 
mathematical refinement of what is a philosophical or psychological theory. The book 
does, of course, have “Economic Behavior” in its title but to Coombs et al. economic 
behavior was a subset of behavior, just as social, religious, political or any other kind 
of behavior, and thus part of psychology. Mathematical psychologists drew on 
sources that economics also relied on, but they employed these sources in a different 
way than did economists. A similar case is Krantz, Luce, Suppes, and Tversky’s 
reference to Debreu work as measurement theory, as mentioned above.
4. Decision theory and behavioral decision research
4.1 Decision theory
The main question that Coombs had started his mathematical psychology program 
with was how could Thurstone’s measurement theory be brought in line with the new 
representational theory of measurement, a process that culminated in Foundations o f  
Measurement, an axiomatic interpretation of the representational theory of 
measurement that has little to do anymore with Thurstone. But mathematical 
psychology maintained the link with Thurstone and psychophysics in general by 
continuing to emphasize the two-sided role of their approach as being both a theory of 
measurement and a psychological theory of human behavior. Furthermore, with 
respect to their theory of human behavior the mathematical psychologists brought 
their theories in line with the recent developments in theories of human behavior. The 
new theory they incorporated was decision theory. The thus modernized two-sided 
theory of psychophysics was described as follows at the beginning of Chapter eight, 
Foundations o f  Measurement I:
15
Unlike most theories of measurement, which may have both physical and 
behavioral interpretations, the theory of expected utility is devoted explicitly 
to the problem of making decisions when their consequences are uncertain. It 
is probably the most familiar example of a theory of measurement in the social 
sciences. [Krantz et al. (1971), p.369]
In mathematical psychology the originally two-sided psychophysical theory of just 
noticeable differences had been abandoned, but the idea of one theory serving both as 
a theory of measurement and as a theory of human behavior had been maintained. No 
economist, perhaps with the exception of Francis Edgeworth, would have understood 
utility theory as a theory of measurement. But for the mathematical psychologists the 
representational theory of measurement and the theory of expected utility theory, or 
decision theory, were two sides of the same psychological coin.
Decision theory studied which decision an individual should make when he or 
she is faced with uncertain or incomplete information. Decision theory’s revival in the 
twentieth century was principally due to Leonard Savage. It goes back to the second 
half of the seventeenth century when mathematicians and other scholars started to 
investigate how to calculate mathematically the optimal decision in uncertain 
situations. The starting point is prosaically represented by the figure of the Chevalier 
de Mere, a notorious gentleman-gambler at the court of Louis XIV, who asked 
mathematicians Blaise Pascal and Pierre de Fermat to solve a number of gambling 
problems. The mathematics that came out of these and similar questions was 
probability theory and rational choice theory [Hacking (1975), Daston (1988)]. 
Eighteenth-century probability theory gave rise to nineteenth-century statistics and 
came to pervade every corner of scientific and daily life [Daston (1983,1988), Porter 
(1986,1994)], and it is therefore no exaggeration to characterize this development as 
“probabilistic revolution” [Krüger, Daston, and Heidelberger (1987), Krüger, 
Gigerenzer, and Morgan (1987)].
A major problem confronting probability theory was what became known as 
the ‘St. Petersburg Paradox,’ invented by Nicholas Bernoulli in 1713. Bernoulli 
demonstrated that gambles could be constructed for which probability theory
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computed a maximum willingness to pay that was clearly at odds with intuition . 1 0 The 
most famous solution to the St. Petersburg Paradox was offered by his cousin Daniel 
Bernoulli in 1738 [Bernoulli (1954)]. Daniel Bernoulli distinguished between wealth 
and “moral wealth,” in which moral wealth depends on wealth logarithmically . 11 Up 
until the early twentieth century the literature on mathematical theory of decision 
making under uncertainty consisted mainly of attempts to solve this and similar 
paradoxes [Edwards (1954), p.380].
Between the 1920s and the 1950s a number of ideas were introduced that 
thoroughly reshaped the way decision theorists, as they were now labeled, thought 
about decision making under uncertainty . 1 2 Authors such as Bruno de Finetti [e.g. de 
Finetti (1937,1949, 1951)] and Frank Ramsey [Ramsey (1931)] introduced the idea 
that probability theory could not only be applied to objective uncertainties out there in 
the world, such as the probability that a coin falls heads and the probability that the 
sun rises tomorrow, but also to subjective probabilities, that is uncertainties inside the 
individual of the sort ‘how uncertain am I that it will rain tomorrow?,’ or ‘how certain 
am I that this second-hand car will last at least two years?’ In a related development, 
authors such as John Maynard Keynes [Keynes (1921)] and Rudolf Carnap [Carnap 
(1950)] extended the theory of logic to include uncertain propositions, that is 
propositions with a degree of probability that is less than 1. 13 In this logical 
probability approach, uncertainty stems from the subject’s personal belief in the 
occurrence of an event. The difference between objective and subjective probability is 
that objective probability is a probability obtained on the basis of available 
information and mathematical theory, a probability that is the same for everyone. 
Subjective probability, on the other hand, is a number attached to the personal belief 
of an individual. Subjective probabilities of the same event may thus differ across 
individuals.
The distinction between the two was not unproblematic and this is still not the 
case, for it is difficult to determine where to draw the line between the two. Statistical
10 The St. Petersburg paradox has given rise to a vast array of literature. An overview of the different 
sides to the debate that have developed over the past 250 years can be found in Jorland (1987).
11 As a synonym for moral wealth the original Latin text used the term “emolumentum,” which in the 
English translation of 1954 is translated as “utility,” upon the advice of Savage. See also Teira (2006).
12 This paragraph briefly indicates a few points in a large literature. Useful overviews are Hajek (2007), 
von Plato (1994), and Eriksson and Hajek (forthcoming).
13 This research can be traced back to nineteenth-century authors such as George Boole and Augustus 
De Morgan [e.g. Maas (2005), pp.111-122, MacHale (1985)].
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data, the basis for objective probability, is information observed by human beings and 
can thus equally be considered input for a subjective probability. Moreover, all of the 
calculations for objective probability are always conducted by human beings, and can 
therefore also be considered as subjective probabilities instead of objective 
probabilities. Adherents of the so-called subjectivist or Bayesian school argued 
precisely this: that statistics is simply the extension of the process of human belief 
formation to a more formal domain. This ipso facto  meant that the whole of statistics 
is a process of human decision making under uncertainty, albeit a process which is 
scrutinized more rigorously and recorded more formally.
In other words, the subjectivist probability theory commenced by de Finetti 
and Ramsey, and the logical probability approach of Keynes, Carnap and others made 
statistics a part of decision theory. Thus, Wald’s influential Statistical Decision 
Functions (1950) stated on the first page that “[a] statistical decision problem arises 
when we are faced with a set of alternative decisions, one of which must be made, and 
the degree of preference for the various possible decisions depends on the unknown 
distribution F(x) of X” [Wald (1950), p.2, see also Fishburn (1964)]. Decision theory 
was no longer only about which decision we as human beings should make given our 
preferences and the objective probability of different states of the world, but it was 
also about which conclusion should be inferred by statisticians from statistical data. 
Decision theory had incorporated statistics and was now an all-encompassing theory 
of human decision making under uncertainty.
Another new development was initiated by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s 
Theory o f  Games and Economic Behavior (1944). In the course of constructing game 
theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern introduced the concept of stochastic 
preference, which can be found either in a weak or a strong form [see Tversky (1969) 
for the distinction between the two]. Stochastic preference embodies the idea that an 
individual who has only a very small preference for A as opposed to B, may not 
always correctly perceive this small difference and may mistakenly choose B. The 
difference is so small that he or she cannot consciously perceive it and considers him- 
or herself to be indifferent towards A and B. However, if  the choice is repeated a large 
number of times, he or she will nevertheless choose A more often than B. Therefore, 
this individual is said to stochastically prefer A to B.
Stochastic preference eliminated the concept of indifference. Even if the 
individual has an infinitely small preference for A as opposed to B, this preference
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would show up if the choice was repeated often enough. The individual is unaware of 
his or her preference for A as opposed to B and considers him- or herself to be 
indifferent, but he or she is not, and the mathematics therefore needs to model him or 
her as such. In a similar way, stochastic preference dealt the final blow to 
experimental psychology’s just noticeable differences. Just noticeable differences, as 
previously mentioned, were introduced by Fechner as the lowest difference in 
stimulus, including that between preferences, which an individual could observe.
With stochastic preference, the concept of just noticeable difference had become 
obsolete. The experimenter could now give the subject the same choice a large 
number of times and from the outcome it could be inferred which of the two options 
he or she preferred, even if the individual him- or herself claimed to be indifferent. 
Stochastic preference allowed going below just noticeable differences, and thus 
rendered it obsolete as a starting point for psychophysics . 1 4
Furthermore, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) cut short the discussion 
on what exactly utility is and how it should be measured: “We [..] assume that the aim 
of all participants in the economic system, consumers as well as entrepreneurs, is 
money, or equivalently a single monetary commodity. This is supposed to be 
unrealistically divisible and substitutable, freely transferable and identical, even in the 
quantitative sense, with whatever “satisfaction” or “utility” is desired by each 
participant [von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), p.8 , emphasis added]. With 
regard to the unit of analysis of decision theory, von Neumann and Morgenstern thus 
effectively turned the clock back to before Daniel Bernoulli, when the rational 
decision depended on the absolute, objective value of money. For von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, the agents in decision problems wanted to maximize their monetary 
income, not their Bernoullian utility. However, von Neumann and Morgenstern 
(1944) labeled this money ‘utility.’
The different aspects and new ideas were organized under the heading of one 
theory by Leonard “Jimmy” Savage (1917-1971) in his The Foundations o f  Statistics 
(1954). Savage divided decision theory into two realms, a normative realm and what 
he labeled, an “empirical” realm, a reference to the “empirical” domain of 
measurement theory, as discussed above. In the normative realm, rational human 
beings investigated how decision making under uncertainty should be done, and
14 Note the similarity with Thurstone’s psychophysical theory of measurement as discussed above. See 
also Gigerenzer (1987a,b).
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established rational principles for this behavior. In the empirical domain, scientists 
investigated whether people in everyday life behave according to the principles of the 
normative theory. For the research in the empirical domain Savage had the 
experimental psychologists in mind, but as a mathematician Savage himself stuck to 
developing the normative theory. The investigation of normative or rational decision 
behavior was considered a deductive science, an investigation that was best done in 
the comfort of the armchair. But it was, according to Savage, not just mathematicians 
who had contributed or could contribute to developing this normative theory. 
Important contributions had been made by economists and philosophers. Savage thus 
considered economics and philosophy to be deductive armchair sciences just like 
mathematics.
The purpose of The Foundations o f  Statistics was to bring together two themes 
in Western thought that go back to ancient Greece: inductive inference and reasoning 
[Savage (1954), p.1]. The formal investigation of reasoning is logic. Until the end of 
the first half of the twentieth century when Savage introduced his position, logic was 
only concerned with certain propositions; the purpose of Savage’s book, and the 
logical probability and subjective probability tradition in which it stood, was to extend 
logic to uncertain propositions . 15 As inductive inference typically leads to uncertain 
propositions, in the sense that the probability that one’s inference is correct is never 1 , 
such an extension united reasoning and inductive inference. The result was what we 
call statistics. “Decisions made in the face of uncertainty pervade the life of every 
individual and organization,” Savage argued, and,”[i]t may be said to be the purpose 
of this book, and indeed of statistics generally, to discuss the implications of 
reasoning for the making of decisions” [Savage (1954), p.6 ].
Savage’s theory investigated what a rational person does in the face of 
uncertainty. Rationality to Savage is a theory of reasoning, either formalized or not. 
For certain propositions, it is generally accepted that this theory is logic. That is, the 
axioms of logic are widely accepted as describing and providing rules for reasoning 
about certain propositions. For the extension of logic to uncertainty Savage presented 
in the book, this was less clear, as the theory still had to be developed. That is, Savage 
contended that it was as yet not clear whether the axioms he presented were indeed
15 I here forgo discussion of Savage’s historical introduction. As above, one may object by pointing to 
for instance George Boole and Augustrus De Morgan. Savage, however, does not discuss the period in 
between the Bernoullis and de Finetti, Andrey Kolmogoroff and Ramsey.
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the best description, and provided the best rules, for reasoning under uncertainty. The 
reader must subsequently thus verify for him- or herself the axioms Savage presented.
How could this be achieved? As these axioms had to do with reasoning, the 
reader should verify them by reasoning. In fact, Savage was cautious when seeking to 
convince the reader of his approach. “I am about to build up a highly idealized theory 
of the behavior of a “rational” person with respect to decisions,” he wrote. But,” [i]n 
doing so I will, of course, have to ask you to agree with me that such and such 
maxims of behavior are “rational.” [..] So, when certain [i.e. some - FH] maxims are 
presented for your consideration, you must ask yourself whether you try to behave in 
accordance with them, or, to put it differently, how you would react if  you noticed 
yourself violating them” [Savage (1954), p.7]. Like the axioms of logic, Savage’s 
“maxims of behavior” were axioms of decision making that all rational individuals 
should agree upon. They were independent of any preferences or beliefs and derived 
from an introspection that comes before experience of any kind.
Savage’s theory did not say anything about whether people in the real world 
actually behave according to his theory. It is important to distinguish this from the 
previous point. On the one hand, Savage’s readers, philosophers, mathematicians, 
economists, psychologists and any other rational individuals needed to investigate 
through introspective reasoning, whether they agreed with the new axioms for 
decision making under uncertainty, as they had done for over two thousand years with 
the axioms of logic proper. If these axioms were agreed upon, they could then be used 
as rules for sound reasoning, just like the rules of logic had been used as rules for 
sound reasoning. On the other hand, when established and agreed upon, the question 
could be posed whether people in their everyday decision making under uncertainty 
would behave in accordance with the new axioms. It should be stressed that such an 
exercise could only be undertaken when the rules of reasoning had been established, 
at the very least by the scientists conducting the empirical investigation. In other 
words, in such an empirical investigation into real-life decision making under 
uncertainty, the rules or axioms themselves were agreed to be true, and could not be 
experimentally scrutinized. It would nevertheless be fruitful to conduct empirical 
investigation in sciences, such as psychology, which were concerned with actual 
decision behavior by people in the real world, and not so much with the theory of 
reasoning itself. In order to clarify this point Savage conceptually distinguished
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between the already-mentioned normative and empirical realms [Savage (1954), 
pp.19-20].
What conclusion needed to be drawn when a subject in an experimental setting 
was observed to make a decision that violated the rules governing the theory of 
reasoning? First of all, the theory could only be applied experimentally to subjects 
that can reason. Roughly, this included all normal and healthy adults; it was not useful 
to ask a subject that cannot reason to make a rational decision. Children, the mentally 
disabled and animals were therefore excluded from experimental investigation. But 
when subjects capable of reasoning were observed making decisions that violated the 
axioms, such decisions were deemed irrational decisions, or simply errors. To Savage 
these errors were the result of failed or too little reasoning. The individual had made a 
mistake in his or her reasoning or had not given it enough thought. When the subject 
would think further or when his or her error would be explained, he or she would 
recognize his or her mistake and correct his or her behavior. Savage noted that 
“ [t]here is, of course, an important sense in which preferences, being entirely 
subjective, cannot be in error; but in a different, more subtle sense they can be. [..] A 
man buying a car for $2,134.50 is tempted to order it with a radio installed, which will 
bring the total price to $2,228.41, feeling that the difference is trifling. But, when he 
reflects that, if he already had the car, he certainly would not spend $93.85 for a radio 
for it, he realizes that he has made an error” [Savage (1954), p.103].
How should the empirical testing of the theory be done? The central issue here 
was that the information needed to make a rational decision should be the same for 
the experimenter and experimental subject alike. The reason was that if  the 
experimenter was not sure that the experimental subject used the exact same 
information as input for his or her decision, the experimenter could never establish 
whether the subject was making the correct decision, or an error. For instance, if  the 
experimental subject believes that the deck of cards of the experimenter has been 
shuffled unfairly, while the experimenter knows that it has been shuffled fairly, the 
subject could make a decision that is rational given his or her own belief, but which is 
irrational given the experimenter’s belief. In the case of decision making under 
uncertainty, it should be completely clear what the uncertainty of the inference was, 
and what the value of the decision was. In other words, the probabilities and utilities 
of the different decisions involved should be clear.
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To conceptually clarify, Savage invented the term ‘small world,’ as opposed to 
‘grand world’ in which we live most of the time, for situations in which probabilities 
and utilities are clearly defined. A small world is a decision situation in which all the 
probabilities, utilities and consequences of the different options are clear to both 
experimenter and experimental subject. Therefore, “[i]t will be noticed that the small- 
world states are in fact events in the grand world, that indeed they constitute a 
partition of the grand world” [Savage (1954), p.84]. For instance, when the subject is 
asked to choose between five dollars for certain or a six in ten chance of winning ten 
dollars, this is a small world situation. The uncertainty and value of each decision are 
defined and clear to everyone. However, when the subject is asked to choose between 
a ten-year old Mercedes and a three-year old Toyota, we are in a large world decision 
situation. Both the value of the different options as well as the probabilities of all 
kinds of uncertainties associated with the two options is unclear and dissimilar for 
both the experimenter and experimental subject.
The value of the different options was to be measured in utilities. On the 
interpretation of the theory of utility, Savage fully sided with von Neumann and 
Morgenstern. Echoing the Theory o f  Games and Economic Behavior, Savage 
suggested that economists and others had been somewhat led astray in constructing 
complicated theories of utility, as a result of the previously-mentioned paper by 
Bernoulli. “For a long period,” Savage argued,” economists accepted Bernoulli’s idea 
of moral wealth as the measurement of a person’s well-being apart from any 
consideration of probability, though “utility” rather than “moral wealth” has been the 
popular name for this concept among English-speaking economists.” As a result, 
“ [e]conomists were for a time enthusiastic about the principle of diminishing marginal 
utility, and they saw what they believed to be reflections of it in many aspects of 
everyday life” [Savage (1954), p.95]. However, thanks to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern we were now back on the right track and able to measure choice-options 
by using a money scale of utility. Utility equals money and is nothing more than a 
convenient measurement scale of preferences. “A function U that [..] arithmetizes the 
relation of preferences among acts will be called utility. [..] I have chosen to use the 
name “utility” in preference to any other, in spite of some unfortunate connotations 
this name has in connection with economic theory, because it was adopted by von
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Neumann and Morgenstern when they revived the concept to which it refers, in a 
most stimulating way” [Savage (1954), p.95].
Savage’s decision theory may sound rather theoretical and anything but 
applicable to everyday life, but normative decision theory could also be applied to 
questions in the world outside science’s ivory tower. Indeed, the whole purpose of 
decision theory was to help us to make better decisions. During World War Two in 
the United States, the application of decision theory to everyday problems developed 
under the rubric of operations research [e.g. Klein (2000)]. Operations research aimed 
to gather all information available relating to a particular problem and then use 
decision theory to calculate the optimal decision. “Operations research makes the 
claim that, by pitting the forces of research against large-scale problems, the decision 
maker (manager, president, general, etc.) will be freed to devote his time to other 
tasks” [Fishburn (1964), p.4]. Although based on deductive introspective reasoning, 
decision theory was explicitly meant to be applied to real world decision problems. In 
turn, behavioral decision research was closely related to operations research. It was a 
newly-created field in psychology that, like operations research, sought to apply 
decision theory to real-world problems.
4.2 Behavioral decision research
The founding father of the empirical investigation of decision theory in psychology 
was Edwards, who in 1958 joined the University of Michigan [Philips and von 
Winterfeldt (2006)]. In Michigan Edwards founded the Engineering Psychology 
Laboratory to study and improve human decision making [Fryback (2005)]. Edwards 
was strongly influenced by von Neumann and Morgenstern’s and Stevens’ work on 
measurement, and was one of the first promoters of Savage’s normative-empirical 
decision making program. Edwards admired Savage as one admires a genius, 
something Edwards shared with others who had read The Foundations o f  Statistics, 
such as Luce, Tversky and Krantz [Krantz -  interview (2008)]. Edwards’ 1954 article 
on the historical background of decision making research, “The Theory of Decision
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Making,” and its 1961 follow-up, “Behavioral Decision Theory,” created the field of 
behavioral decision research . 1 6 Behavioral decision research was dominated by 
Edwards until the early 1970s. From that moment on a number of his students started 
to develop their own interpretations. The most successful were Slovic and 
Lichtenstein, who developed a constructed preferences approach that drew 
connections with Simon [e.g. Slovic and Lichtenstein (1971, 1973, 1983)]; and 
Kahneman and Tversky [e.g. Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979)].
Edwards and his behavioral decision research adopted the framework set out 
by Savage, and understood Savage’s distinction between a normative and an empirical 
domain to be the same as experimental psychology’s distinction between normative 
and descriptive. Decision theory was understood as providing a theoretical framework 
for the objective stimuli that the subject is presented with in his case of decision 
making under uncertainty. The self-assigned task of behavioral decision researchers 
was to investigate experimentally which decision subjects make with respect to this 
objective stimulus. In the traditional framework, experimental psychology 
investigated individuals’ subjective perception of objective values, such as weight or 
brightness differences. In behavioral decision research the weights and light bulbs 
were replaced with the utilities and probabilities of decision theory. Given the 
objective values of the utilities and probabilities, decision theory determined the 
objective decision. Behavioral decision research then investigated experimentally 
which decision the subject actually made. In this way Savage’s decision theory and 
his distinction between a normative and an empirical domain were integrated into the 
experimental psychological framework, in which decision theory determined the 
objective benchmark with which the subject’s subjective decision was compared. The 
distinction between the normative and the descriptive was often and clearly made by 
behavioral decision researchers. Here is an example:
16 Different names for Edwards’ program and its offspring exist. Behavioral decision research, 
behavioral decision theory, and behavioral decision making are all used to refer to the same 
psychological program. It is not clear when and how these terms exactly originated; although 
behavioral decision theory has been around at least since Edwards published his second overview 
article in 1961. Behavioral decision research, the most commonly used label seems to have originated 
in the 1970s, but has been applied in retrospect to the research of the 1960s also. To avoid confusion I 
use the term behavioral decision research in this thesis.
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Decision theory is the study of how decisions are or ought to be made. Thus it 
has two faces: descriptive and normative. Descriptive decision theory attempts 
to describe and explain how actual choices are made. It is concerned with the 
study of variables that determine choice behavior in various contexts. As such, 
it is a proper branch of psychology. Normative decision theory is concerned 
with optimal rather than actual choices. Its main function is to prescribe which 
decision should be made, given the goals of the decision maker and the 
information available to him. Its results have a prescriptive nature. They assert 
that if  an individual wishes to maximize his expected gain, for example, then 
he should follow a specified course of action. As such normative decision 
theory is a purely deductive discipline.
[Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky (1970), p.114]
It was in this regard that Edwards was interested in economics, as exemplified 
by his extensive and knowledgeable discussion of economics in Edwards (1954). Like 
Savage, Edwards understood economics as a normative, deductive theory of human 
decision making, and he discussed it on an equal footing with statistics, mathematics 
and philosophy. Thus, Edwards noted that economics is an “armchair” science 
[Edwards (1954), p.14], not because he denounced economics, but because he 
understood economics to be an armchair science just as mathematics, statistics, and 
philosophy. In his classification of the field of decision theory as a) the theory of 
riskless choice, b) the application of the theory of riskless choice to welfare 
economics, c) the theory of risky choices, d) transitivity in decision making, and e) 
the theory of games and of statistical decision function, economics is predominantly 
about a) and b). Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s Theory o f  Games and Economic 
Behavior (1944) was understood to be a deductive, armchair science as well: Game 
theory as a mathematical theory “can be viewed as a branch of normative decision 
theory” [Coombs, Dawes, and Tversky (1970), p.202].
Edwards’ discussion of “economic man” should also be read in this light. 
Economic man for Edwards is someone who makes his choices according to the 
normative theory, making it therefore a normative concept. If you ask what economic 
man would do in a certain decision problem, you ask what the normative solution is. 
At the same time, economic man as the embodiment of the normative theory, forms a 
hypothesis about actual decision making that can be tested: “if economic man is a
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model for real men, then real men should always exhibit transitivity of real choices. 
Transitivity is an assumption, but it is directly testable. So are the other properties of 
economic man as a model for real men” [Edwards (1954), p.16]. But transitivity and 
the other properties of economic man were also the assumptions of measurement 
theory, as set out before. As a result, mathematical psychologists moved smoothly 
from measurement theory, to decision theory, signal detection theory and back . 1 7  So 
did Edwards and his behavioral decision research.
Savage and other decision theorists investigated the normative decision 
theories, and it was the task of psychologists, according to Edwards, to investigate the 
descriptive part and in turn to see how well human beings in their actual everyday 
decision making behave according to the normative principles set out by decision 
theory. What was at least just as important for Edwards, however, was the question 
how human decision making could be improved. The research conducted and favored 
by Edwards was explicitly called “engineering psychology.” The perceived relevance 
of this research is illustrated by Edwards’ comments on his visit to the North 
American Aerospace Defense Command in the mid 1960s [Phillips and von 
Winterfeldt (2006), p.5]. In this command center an enormous amount of information 
was gathered and decisions made by the personnel had potentially enormous 
consequences. Therefore, it was of utmost importance not only to know how people 
made decisions on the basis of uncertain information, but also to find out how the 
decision system could be organized such that the best decision could be made. In light 
of future developments in the field to be made by Kahneman and Tversky, it should 
be noted here that Edwards and other behavioral decision theorists did not consider 
the human being to be an inapt or limited decision maker in the sense of not 
understanding the divine rules of decision theory. For Edwards, the starting point was 
that the human being is very capable of making complicated decisions in situations 
based on uncertain information. It is just that there is only so much a single human 
being can do. For that reason, human beings may sometimes deviate from what is 
normatively the right decision, and therefore it may be useful to think about how to 
help human beings decide when, for whatever reason, the decision making process is 
especially difficult or especially important.
17 Signal detection theory (SDT) is a branch of psychophysics that investigates the individual’s ability 
to distinguish between signal and noise. In other words, it investigates decision making under noisy 
conditions. See e.g. Green and Swets (1964).
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Edwards and behavioral decision research evaluated decisions in terms of 
utility and extensively referred to economists and their use of the concept of utility. 
Nevertheless, Edwards and behavioral decision research did not understand utility in 
the same way as economists. For behavioral decision research utility was merely a 
new concept for an already existing idea in experimental psychology, that of valence. 
“The notion of utility is very similar to the Lewinian notion of valence. Lewin 
conceives of valence as the attractiveness of an object or activity to a person. Thus, 
psychologists might consider the experimental study of utilities to be the experimental 
study of valence, and therefore an attempt at quantifying parts of the Lewinian 
theoretical schema” [Edwards (1954), p.25, see also Frijda (1986)]. Valence measures 
the intrinsic attractiveness or averseness of an individual to a certain event, object or 
situation. Thus, if  an individual is more attracted to Islam than to Christianity, Islam 
has a higher valence. In addition, emotions can be classified in terms of valence.
Anger and fear are emotions with a negative valence, joy has a positive valence. By 
equating utility with valence, Edwards and behavioral decision research understood 
utility to be a general measurement of an individual’s attitude towards events, objects 
and situations. As a result, an individual preferring ten to eight dollars, was 
psychologically in the same situation as an individual preferring Islam to Christianity.
In behavioral decision research, the behavior of the experimental subjects was 
evaluated in terms of the normative benchmarks. The human being was considered to 
be a mechanism that reasons logically and applies Bayesian statistics. In other words, 
the individual was considered to be a logician and Bayesian statistician of some sort. 
The purpose of behavioral decision research, then, was to figure out whether this 
human being is a good logician and Bayesian statistician. This particular type of 
understanding of human behavior was neatly summarized in a paper by Rapoport and 
Tversky. “[The behavioral decision research] approach to the study of choice 
behavior,” they argued,” is based on the comparison between the normative solution 
of a decision problem and the observed solution employed by subjects.” As a 
consequence, “man is viewed as an intuitive statistician who acts in order to maximize 
some specified criteria while operating on the basis of probabilistic information” 
[Rapoport and Tversky (1970), p.118].
Edwards and the developing behavioral decision research approach created a 
program that took decision theory as provided by mathematicians, economists and 
philosophers, and especially Savage, as point of departure. It compared actual human
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decision making with respect to this norm, measuring the decisions made in terms of 
“utility,” and looked for ways to improve human decision making. But behavioral 
decision researchers recognized that matters were a little more complicated than they 
usually portrayed them. In their introduction to Decision Making  (1967), for instance, 
Edwards and Tversky noted that “the distinction between what an organism should do 
and what it does do is slippery” (p.8 ). The problematic distinction between the 
normative and the descriptive was a recurring theme, although it was far outnumbered 
by the instances in which the distinction was standardly used. The problem was that in 
Savage’s decision theory the normative and the descriptive were closely related. The 
normative rules were rules that every healthy adult should agree with when thinking 
them carefully through. The normative decision theory was as much a prescription for 
optimal behavior as it was a description of an adult’s behavior who has carefully 
thought through which decision to make. In experimental psychology, however, the 
distinction was much stronger. In experimental psychology, the descriptive value of 
the stimulus, the sensation, was supposed to deviate from the objective norm. Thus, 
when decision theory was integrated into the experimental framework, the normative- 
descriptive distinction of decision theory risked becoming a much stronger and much 
more absolute distinction than it was meant to be. This was unproblematic as long as 
the experiments showed that most of the time subjects indeed did make their decisions 
according to the norms of decision theory, and it was what Edwards and his 
behavioral decision researchers expected to find and actually did find. However, when 
the experiments indicated that there might be systematic differences between the 
norms of decision theory and actually observed behavior, an idea that gradually 
developed during the 1960s [Heukelom (2009), ch. 3], it did become problematic.
Throughout his career Edwards wanted to maintain the initial decision 
theoretical understanding of the close connection between the normative and the 
descriptive. Until the early 1970s, his disciples in behavioral decision research kept 
this perspective as well. Normative theory described human behavior in situations 
where we really want to behave as best as we can, for instance in cases where the 
stakes are high. Normative theory was thus to some extent descriptive. Moreover, 
“[d]ecision theory may be viewed as primarily an analysis of the environment; that is, 
an orderly summary of those features of the environment that control behaviour.” 
Therefore, “[s]uch a description of the environment, combined with the simple 
assumptions about behaviour tendencies that the organism brings to that environment,
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may yield an effective description of behaviour” [Edwards and Tversky (1967), p.8 ]. 
Although the distinction between normative and descriptive was used all the time, it 
was at the same time clear that the two sides were closely connected and that perhaps 
it was not possible even to distinguish between the two.
Decision theory and behavioral decision research in the 1950s and 1960s both 
considered themselves to be directly related to economics and used extensive amounts 
of economics. It is especially Edwards’ evidently extensive knowledge of economics 
[e.g. Edwards (1954, 1961)] which tempts the reader to conclude that here we have a 
case in which psychology and economics were truly integrated into one research 
project. But the way in which Savage, Edwards and others talked about economics 
does not resonate with the way in which economists spoke about economics. Such 
different prominent economists as Lionel Robbins, Paul Samuelson, and Milton 
Friedman would not have agreed to be engaged in constructing a normative theory of 
decision making.
Some of this incommensurability showed up in psychologists’ assessment of 
economics. In his discussion of Samuelson’s economics, Edwards was somewhat 
puzzled that “ [i]f preference is operationally defined as choice, then it seems 
unthinkable that this requirement can ever be empirically violated” [Edwards (1954), 
p.15]. Moreover, the interpretation of utility in terms of Lewinian valence appears, if 
perhaps not entirely incompatible, not exactly what economists had in mind when 
they use the concept of utility. Thus, although the frequent references to economics in 
decision theory and behavioral decision research suggest otherwise, economists and 
psychologists understood their disciplines and the relationship between them in 
fundamentally different ways. Quite a few theories and concepts traveled from 
economics to psychology. But the way in which these theories and concepts were 
used in psychology was not something economists would have recognized as 
belonging to their field.
5. “Measurement theory in psychology is behavior theory”
Mathematical psychology was directly related to decision theory and behavioral 
decision research. Mathematical psychology applied mathematics to the investigation 
of psychological phenomena, and as both decision theory and behavioral decision 
research used a great deal of mathematics, a natural and direct link existed between 
the two. How to formulate mathematically how people should behave and how people
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actually do behave in situations under uncertainty, were research questions that 
belonged to mathematical psychology as well as to decision theory and behavioral 
decision research. Hence, the same scientist could naturally be perceived as being a 
contributor to these different fields at the same time. Tversky, Luce, and Suppes serve 
as examples.
But the link between mathematical psychology, decision theory, and 
behavioral decision research also went much further than the mere use of 
mathematics. Mathematical psychology’s representational theory of measurement and 
behavioral decision research’s experimental investigation of human decision making 
started from different perspectives, but were partly about the same subject: normative 
decision behavior. Mathematical psychology’s representational theory of 
measurement used the human body as a measurement device. In the case of utilities 
and probabilities, for instance, the human being was used to measure human 
perception of utilities and probabilities, human perception of risk averseness, and 
human perception of loss averseness. But in order to make this a valid procedure it 
must be assumed that the human being as a measurement device functions 
consistently. Furthermore, the representational theory of measurement’s definition of 
consistency was: according to the normative rules of decision theory. The assumption 
needed to be made was that the human measurement instrument behaved according to 
the normative decision theory.
Behavioral decision research, on the other hand, compared behavior of 
individuals in its experiments with the norms of decision theory, for which it used the 
representational theory of measurement. The two fitted neatly together. Assuming that 
subjects behave according to the normative rules, the mathematical psychologists set 
up measurement frameworks that measured the perception of utilities, risk averseness 
and so on. Assuming that, in general, subjects behave according to the normative 
rules, behavioral decision researchers investigated under which circumstances 
subjects made mistakes. Mathematical psychologists provided behavioral decision 
research with a solid theory of measurement, and behavioral decision research 
informed mathematical psychologists under which circumstances its human 
measurement instrument was less accurate.
To illustrate further why for mathematical psychologists “measurement theory 
in psychology is behavior theory,” [Coombs (1983), p.36] it is useful to ask how 
experimental psychologists measured the phenomena they were interested in. How
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did they measure the attitude of religious people who go to church twice a day? How 
did they measure the perception of “rape” in terms of good versus bad? How did they 
measure the perception of a probability of 0.01%? How did they measure the relative 
utility of receiving a certain ten dollars as opposed to a 0 . 8  chance of receiving fifteen 
dollars? The answer, as already indicated, is that they measured all these 
psychological phenomena through the human being. “In psychological measurement, 
the individual is the measuring device; he plays the role of the pan balance, the meter 
stick, or the thermometer” [Coombs (1983), p.36]. The psychologist used individuals 
to measure the value of psychological phenomena of the individual. This could be the 
human being in general, it could be the member of a culture, and it could even be the 
individual itself. One could, for instance, use individuals as a measurement instrument 
to measure the individual’s risk averseness. “Psychological measurement theory is 
concerned with the empirical regularities in [the individual’s] behavior that justify 
numerical assignments to the stimuli he is responding to and/or justify numerical 
assignments to him” [Coombs (1983), p.36].
However, to “justify numerical assignments” to stimuli and to “justify 
numerical assignments” to the individual on the basis of “empirical regularities in this 
behavior” the psychologists needed to understand that behavior. They, in other words, 
needed a theory describing human behavior. The psychologists needed to understand 
how humans function to be able to use them as measurement instruments, just as the 
physicist needs to understand how the thermometer works in order to use it as an 
instrument. But in the case of the human being as a measurement instrument, this 
could not be just any understanding; it needed to be a rational understanding. Work 
done by Heidelberger (1993, 2004) points us to the fact that in nineteenth-century 
German experimental psychology, the human being functioned as a measurement 
device. We now see that post World War Two work regarding the representational 
theory of measurement and in behavioral decision research showed that in order for 
the human being to function as a measurement instrument the human being needed to 
be understood as behaving rationally. The psychologist needed to have a 
psychophysical or decision theoretical explanation of the individual’s response 
towards different stimuli in terms of rationality. In the case of decision making on the 
basis of utilities and probabilities, that theory of rationality was decision theory. 
Decision theory explained how an individual would rationally respond to different 
stimuli, and thus informed the psychologist which numeral to assign to the different
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stimuli. To make the link between measurement theory and decision theory one had to 
assume that the individual that is used as the measurement instrument behaves 
rationally.
What happens if  we find out that this individual in fact does not always behave 
rationally? This question did not come up seriously until the late 1960s. However, 
from the above we can see what happens. If individuals are found to behave 
irrationally, this is problematic for decision theory because it means that decision 
theory does not provide a good description of human behavior. As long as the 
deviations from decision theory are random this is not too problematic. It would be 
the same problem as knowing that some or even all of the thermometers do not 
measure exactly right but that they measure correctly on average. However, when 
individuals are found to deviate systematically from the norms of decision theory, it 
becomes a serious problem. It not only means that decision theory is not a good 
description of actual, rational human behavior, it also implies that measurement 
theory is based on flawed assumptions. For instance, if  the psychologist wants to 
measure what the relative value of two uncertain outcomes is and assumes that people 
have decided rationally, he or she simply asks a few people which of the two they 
prefer and thus measures which of the two has the highest expected value. But if  it 
now turns out that human beings systematically deviate from rational behavior, the 
psychologist cannot infer from their choices, i.e. from the measurement, which of the 
two options has the higher expected value.
6. Conclusion
Mathematical psychology continued experimental psychology’s focus on 
mathematization and measurement. In the postwar period it aligned itself with the re­
appearance of decision theory in the work of Savage, and with the empirical 
investigation of decision theory in Edwards’ behavioral decision research. This 
alliance proved that in order to use the human being as a measurement instrument in 
psychology, it needed to be assumed that the individual makes its decisions rationally. 
Behavioral decision research was related to mathematical psychology’s measurement 
theory in its use of measurement theory. Behavioral decision research compared 
experimentally actual human decision behavior with the norms of decision theory, 
with the explicit purpose of engineering solutions for situations in which decision 
making is particularly difficult, or the individual is prone to make mistakes. The three
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intertwined developments of mathematical psychology, decision theory, and 
behavioral decision research together constituted a scientific program of human 
decision behavior revolving around a set of axioms that determine rational or 
normative decision behavior. Furthermore, a comparison of human behavior to this 
normative benchmark could be made within a descriptive domain by means of 
experimental investigation.
It is tempting to conclude from the many references made to economics in 
mathematical psychology, decision theory and behavioral decision research that the 
three were connected to economics. And to some extent this is true. Mathematical 
psychology did incorporate economic texts, and Edwards, and to a minor extent 
Savage, based their research on extensive discussions of economics. But mathematical 
psychology, decision theory, and behavioral decision research used the economic 
literature for their own purposes, and they did this in ways that were at odds with 
economic practice.
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